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 11  E pluribus plurum , or, How to 
fail to get to utopia in spite of 
really trying 
 Chandran  Kukathas 
 11.1  Introduction 
 “The framework for utopia,” Robert Nozick tells us at the begin-
ning of the fi nal section of  Part  iii of  Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
( ASU ), “is equivalent to the minimal state” (p. 333). The rich and 
complex body of argumentation of Parts  i and  ii had produced the 
conclusion that the minimal, and no more than a minimal, state 
was legitimate or morally justifi ed. What  Part  iii reveals is that the 
minimal state “is the one that best realizes the utopian aspirations 
of untold dreamers and visionaries” (p. 333). Although this happy 
convergence is surely no accident, neither, Nozick insists, is it con-
trived, for it is the conclusion reached by two independent lines of 
argument. If there is a framework for utopia – or, as I shall from now 
simply say, utopia – it is the minimal state. 
 The obvious question to ask, then, is whether Nozick is right 
that the minimal state gives us utopia – understanding utopia in 
the way that he would have us do. The thesis of this chapter is that 
Nozick does not succeed. What  Part  iii offers is neither a plausible 
account of a utopian community nor the inspiring conception of a 
state that Nozick promises. The root of the problem lies in Nozick’s 
initial rejection of anarchy, for the idea of utopia he wants to defend 
is one that is achievable outside the state but not within it. What he 
tries to do in  Part  iii is to put back into his political philosophy that 
which was taken away in  Part i , when the legitimacy of the min-
imal state’s incorporation of ultra-minimal states was settled. It is 
within the framework of the minimal state “that one’s nonimperi-
alistic vision of the good society is to be propounded and realized” 
(p. 332). Indeed Nozick tells us that “[a]llowing us to do that is what 
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the framework is  for ” (p. 332). The aim of this chapter is to show 
that the framework can do no such thing. In the end, the purpose 
of the state is to limit rather than enable people’s pursuit of diverse 
ends. It is a way of making the many live as one. To the extent 
that those who do not wish to conform are compelled to do so, the 
state suppresses rather than enables the pursuit of diverse ideals. Of 
course, it may be that this is as much as is feasible in human soci-
ety. But it may be too much to call this utopia. 
 This chapter is presented in fi ve main sections. The fi rst presents 
a critical account of Nozick’s conception of utopia. The second then 
looks closely at Nozick’s conception of the state (and his claim that 
both the legitimacy and justice arguments of Parts  i and  ii and the 
utopia arguments of  Part  iii lead to the minimal state). The third 
section argues that the minimal state cannot give us utopia. The 
fourth goes on to show that no state can give us utopia. The fi nal 
section asks where this leaves Nozick’s theory. 
 11.2  Nozick’s conception of utopia 
 Utopia is commonly understood to be an “imaginary place or situ-
ation of ideal perfection,” 1 although many dictionaries defi ne it more 
narrowly as a place that has reached social and political perfection. 
For utopian theorists, from  Thomas More to William Morris to 
B. F. Skinner, utopia has generally been presented as a place where 
people live as they should and in which they realize some important 
good. They imagine the best of all possible worlds. Nozick, however, 
begins his refl ections on utopia by noting that the “best of all pos-
sible worlds for me will not be that for you” (p. 298). The world that 
I would most prefer to live in, he observes, will not be the one you 
would choose. “Utopia, though, must be, in some restricted sense, 
the best for all of us; the best world imaginable, for each of us” 
(p. 298). What Nozick suggests is crucial for any society to qualify 
as utopian is that it is a society whose members want to be there, or 
at least cannot imagine a place they would rather be. Utopia is not 
a place that’s (objectively)  good for human or rational beings to be, 
but a place that such beings would most  want to be. 
 It is worth remarking how unusual this is in utopian thinking, 
which, as Nozick recognizes, generally gives a good deal of atten-
tion to the problem of how to bring the inhabitants of utopia to 
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conform to its ideal. Utopians do not normally begin by accepting 
the diversity of human desires. 2 For Nozick this is crucial. This is 
not because he thinks that desires are fi xed or unconditioned by 
circumstances or that people are incapable of being brought to new 
and better ideas of what ends are worth pursuing. Even desires can 
be discovered. But desires cannot and should not be discounted; 
and any good society must be one in which the inhabitants remain 
members willingly. Given the diversity of desires, or of views of 
what ends are generally worth pursuing, people are likely to hit 
upon different ideas of the ideal society; and while this is unlikely 
to issue in a world of societies of single individuals it will mean a 
world in which people settle voluntarily into a variety of communi-
ties of (like-minded) people. If utopia is to exist it cannot be in the 
form of a single society to which everyone belongs – unless people 
become very different than they are now, or at least all come to 
believe that the same particular society is the one for them. Utopia 
is better understood not as a single community of similar people but 
as a collectivity of different communities each made up of people 
who are drawn together because mutual association gives them the 
best life they can imagine. 
 It is highly unlikely, Nozick points out, that actual communities 
will be made up of people who are satisfi ed with every aspect of it. 
Even the best community anyone can imagine being a part of will, 
realistically, involve some compromise, since no one can expect to 
be a part of a community in which everyone else subordinates their 
interests to her. Why would anyone else join such a community? So 
every community, even the most utopian, will involve some com-
promise. Nonetheless, some communities will be more attractive 
to any particular person than will others. What will happen is that 
people will move into the communities they fi nd the best of all 
possible – which is to say, available – communities. Of course, this 
means that some communities that are unable to attract members 
will wither away and die, or transform themselves into communi-
ties others truly want to join. 
 Utopia in Nozick’s conception is not a fi nal state, or a stage at the 
end of history, or an isolated world for which time has stood still. 
It is, rather, a changing condition that varies from person to person 
and place to place, as well as from time to time. For utopia to be 
achieved, however, what needs to remain constant is the framework 
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that enables people to form communities, conduct experiments in 
living, move between societies, and discover what lives suit them.
 Utopia is a framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to 
realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where 
no one can  impose his own utopian vision upon others. The utopian soci-
ety is the society of utopianism … utopia is meta-utopia: the environment 
in which utopian experiments may be tried out; the environment in which 
people are free to do their own thing; the environment which must, to a 
great extent, be realized fi rst if more particular utopian visions are to be 
realized stably. (p. 312) 
 Although Nozick uses the term “utopia” in different ways, some-
times to refer to the “framework” that makes the pursuit of particu-
lar ideal communities or ways of life possible, and at other times to 
refer to the communities or ways of life themselves, the idea he is 
advancing is easy enough to grasp. There are many possible ways of 
living, and though it is unlikely that any one of them will be found 
fulfi lling by each and everyone, the best we can hope for is a struc-
ture that makes it possible for us to fi nd the society that best suits 
each of us, and that makes it possible to learn how to sustain and 
improve those that seem most successful. That structure, he thinks, 
is the state, albeit the minimal – and only the minimal – state. 
 11.3  Nozick’s conception of the state 
 In  Part i of  ASU Nozick sets out to refute the individualist anarchist 
contention that no state has legitimate authority by showing how 
the state can arise out of a (Lockean) state of nature without anyone’s 
(Lockean) rights being violated.  Whether or not Nozick’s invisible-
hand explanation (and justifi cation) of the emergence of the state is 
successful has been hotly debated, and anarchists remain uncon-
vinced. But if Nozick has justifi ed the state (minimal or otherwise), 
what exactly is it that he has justifi ed? After explaining that indi-
viduals’ need in the state of nature to protect their rights would lead 
to the creation of protection agencies, which would ultimately be 
transformed into territorially bound, dominant protective associ-
ations, Nozick writes as follows:
 [W]ithout claiming to possess any rights uniquely, a protective agency dom-
inant in a territory will occupy a unique position. Though each person has 
Cambridge Collections Online © Cambridge University Press, 2011
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL9780521197762.016
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Singapore Management University (SMU), on 16 Oct 2019 at 03:13:03, subject to the
How to fail to get to utopia 293
a right to act correctly to prohibit others from violating rights (including 
the right not to be punished unless shown to deserve it), only the dominant 
protective association will be able, without sanction, to enforce correct-
ness as it sees it. Its power makes it the arbiter of correctness;  it determines 
what, for purposes of punishment, counts as a breach of correctness. Our 
explanation does not assume or claim that might makes right. But might 
does make enforced prohibitions, even if no one thinks the mighty have a 
 special entitlement to have realized in the world their own view of which 
prohibitions are correctly enforced. (pp. 118–119) 
 The state, he goes on to say, is an institution that has the right to 
enforce rights, prohibit dangerous private enforcement of justice, 
pass upon such private procedures, and is effectively the sole wielder 
within a geographic territory of that right (see p. 119). This under-
standing of the state is a modifi ed  Weberian view, for it asserts that 
the state has a monopoly not on the use of violence but on making 
judgments on the permissibility of violence. It may exercise vio-
lence, particularly when it exercises the right to punish those who 
have exercised violence impermissibly, but so may others – if the 
state says it is permissible. 
 It is also important to note that for Nozick the state has no  spe-
cial rights. It has the right to enforce rights, and to prohibit the dan-
gerous enforcement of justice, but it has no right to claim that all its 
actions are right. Neither the state nor its agents are immune from 
prosecution and punishment for the violation of others rights. The 
Nozickian state does not enjoy sovereign immunity. 
 Most importantly, no actual dominant protective agency or state 
has any entitlement to be the dominant agency or state. It might 
be perfectly legitimate for a king to rule over us, but this does not 
mean that any existing king is entitled to be king. The legitimacy 
of the state is necessary; but the legitimacy of any particular state 
is contingent. 
 There are a number of features of the Nozickian minimal state 
that ought to be noted. First, the minimal state is essentially a modi-
fi ed Dominant Protection Agency, so the great majority of people 
within it would be  clients of the state. Thus, for the great majority 
of people within the territory the Nozickian minimal state does 
not differ from anarchy (since under anarchy people would still join 
protective agencies). Second, Nozick’s argument is not only that a 
minimal state could emerge from a state of nature without violating 
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rights but that people would fi nd it to their advantage to establish a 
minimal state. The state is not the only institution that could arise 
without violating rights, and indeed some bad institutions could 
emerge without doing so. Nozick has sought to show not only that 
the state could arise without violating rights but also that this is 
to people’s advantage. Third, the minimal state makes judgments 
about the permissibility of violence only when its own clients are 
involved. It has no right to dictate the procedures that other agen-
cies may use against those who are not clients of the Dominant 
Protective Agency, unless those procedures adversely affect its own 
clients. 
 The account of the state Nozick offers is very much a norma-
tive one. His question is whether or not the state can be justifi ed; 
and his answer is that it can be provided it is an entity of a cer-
tain kind: one whose underlying rationale is the upholding of a sys-
tem for protecting individual rights. This account abstracts from 
actual historical states in two obvious respects. First, many, if not 
most, states have not acted as agencies dedicated to the uphold-
ing of a system of protecting individual rights – Lockean or other-
wise. Second, even if we ignore the normative dimension, it is not 
clear that Nozick’s concept of the state accounts for the various 
forms of political authority we fi nd in the world. This is not merely 
because no modern states (and, arguably, no earlier ones either) can 
be described as minimal states. It is because the kinds of states we 
fi nd in the world are so diverse it would be difficult for most theor-
ies to account for them all. 
 To begin with, if we think of the state as a kind of corporation, 
as many theorists have suggested, 3 there are many political corpo-
rations in the world, ranging from provinces, to nation states, to 
supra-national organizations such as the European Union, all with 
governments, the power to tax, and the capacity to control (to vary-
ing degrees) what goes on within their territories. The extent of con-
trol varies not only because some corporations are parts of some 
larger federal structure but also because some are condominiums 
(like Andorra) with limited control over their own affairs, while 
others are governments without statehood (like the Palestinian 
authority), while yet others are states without their own govern-
ments (like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq at various stages of their 
recent histories). 
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 The relationship between the state and its inhabitants or mem-
bers also varies, with some exerting control over members beyond 
its territory and most exercising power over inhabitants within its 
borders. The extent of the state’s authority varies quite consider-
ably in part because of the traditions of a particular society, but 
also because membership of supra-national associations or of inter-
national regimes such as UN conventions conditions the powers of 
particular states. 
 The idea that the state arose out of a process of competition 
among contending protection agencies is not historically plausible, 
but it is unlikely Nozick ever thought so. Yet the idea that concep-
tually the state is a kind of protection agency with a client–service-
provider relationship with its members is no more believable. The 
state as it exists now has a life, and interests, of its own. If one is to 
answer the question why anyone should obey the state or recognize 
the legitimacy of its authority, one must also supply an account of 
the state that makes sense of its character. Nozick’s account cannot 
do this. 
 Of course it has to be asked whether a single answer to this ques-
tion is even possible given the variety of entities that present them-
selves and are legally recognized as states. They come in all shapes 
and sizes, from the geographically largest (Russia, taking up more 
than 1.5 million square kilometers) to the smallest (Iceland, tak-
ing up barely 100,000 square kilometers); from the most populous 
(China, with 1.3 billion people, or 19.6 percent of the world’s popu-
lation) to the least populous (Nauru, with 10,000, or Vatican City, 
with 800, neither with as much as a ten–thousandth of a percent of 
the people of the world). They range in their forms of government 
from liberal democracy to authoritarian theocracy to communist 
monarchy (which is how one might characterize North Korea) to 
totalitarian dictatorship. 
 What Nozick offers in his account of the state is an idea that 
bears only a remote resemblance to any of the entities in the world 
today that we call states. It bears little resemblance to the entities 
that emerged with the development of systems of political author-
ity, from principalities and kingdoms to self-governing towns, to 
city-states to republics to empires. All of this makes it difficult to 
see how he is going to be able to mount an argument to show that 
some kind of structure of power like a state can legitimately have 
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authority over any one, or to show that some variant of this entity 
can bring us closer to utopia. 
 11.4  Can a minimal state bring us to utopia? 
 What is it that a state might provide that can help us get (closer) 
to utopia? It seems unlikely that any of the particular features of 
actual states are what Nozick has in mind. But what Nozick seems 
to think states can offer in principle is something called “the frame-
work.” In the end, we do not live in states but in particular commu-
nities. “We  live in particular communities” (p. 332), he says. “It is 
here that one’s nonimperialistic vision of the ideal or good society 
is to be propounded and realized” (p. 332). So why do we need the 
framework? Because “[a]llowing us to do that is what the framework 
is  for ” (p. 332). According to Nozick, “[c]onjoined with many per-
sons’ particular visions, the framework enables us to get the best of 
all possible worlds” (p. 332). The problem is, it is not clear why we 
need a framework to get to utopia. 
 Nozick offers a number of arguments why, but none of them is 
convincing. The fi rst argument is that the framework serves as 
a “fi lter device.” While other utopian theorists have focused on 
the design question, trying to imagine or design the best society, 
Nozick suggests that what we need is a fi lter device that eliminates 
many designs from a large set of alternatives (see p. 314). When the 
alternatives are different kinds of societies, the framework supplies 
the appropriate fi lter device, allowing many different communities 
to fl ourish if they can. Within the framework, “some communi-
ties will be abandoned, others will struggle along, others will split, 
others will fl ourish, gain members, and be duplicated elsewhere” 
(p. 316). Design devices might generate specifi c communities to be 
lived in and tried out; but the fi lter device reveals to us which ones 
succeed, which ones need to be modifi ed, and which ones need to be 
abandoned. Communities that are unattractive will be rejected by 
their inhabitants, other communities will adopt the best practices 
from communities people favor, and ideas for new communities 
often will improve as well (see p. 317). 
 What is obscure in this account, however, is how the framework – 
the minimal state – acts as a fi lter or generates knowledge of the best 
way to live. It seems plausible enough that people experimenting 
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with different forms of life will abandon them if they are unsatis-
fying, that successes will be imitated by people and communities 
willing to change or adapt, and that people will come to know and 
appreciate the greater worth of some ways of living by observing 
the successes and failures of others. Yet, couldn’t this outcome be 
achieved just as well without any kind of state – without any kind of 
framework? In the condition of anarchy people might form different 
kinds of communities, some of which would prove more success-
ful than others. It would seem fairly likely that the successful ones 
would attract more adherents while the unsuccessful ones would be 
abandoned. 
 If the argument is that the fi lter device is something like a com-
petitive market economy it seems plausible enough to think that 
different societies will, in effect, contend with one another for the 
custom of potential members. The most attractive among them 
will capture most of the population, although niche markets might 
well develop for those with particular tastes if the communities 
supplying the minority ways of life do in fact offer a product that 
commands the interest and loyalty of a sufficiently large group. But 
for this to happen there is no need for a framework for a fi ltering 
process to operate. A market could operate perfectly well without 
a structure that includes some communities and excludes others. 
If this structure operates to restrict the size of the market it might 
even limit the capacity of people to learn from the experiments of 
others or to try out new products by moving from one community 
to another. Yet if it imposes no restrictions of the mobility of people, 
goods, and ideas, it is not clear in what way it is serving as a fi lter 
device. 
 If the argument is that the fi lter device is something like a sci-
entifi c community it again seems plausible enough to think that 
the possibility of alternative hypotheses being proposed, examined 
and tested can only enhance our understanding of what works and 
what does not. Yet once again it is not clear how the framework of 
the minimal state does anything to enhance or even facilitate scien-
tifi c discovery. Is the state to act as an authority that decides what 
counts as a valid scientifi c experiment? If so, it is embracing a view 
of science we might criticize drawing on  John Stuart Mill and Paul 
Feyerabend, to argue that science knows no authority. Any effort to 
close off of limit scientifi c inquiry or experimentation should not 
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be welcomed but regarded with suspicion. Yet if the fi lter device 
of the minimal state does no such thing, how does it contribute to 
scientifi c progress? 
 In his account of how the fi lter device does its work Nozick 
argues as follows:
 The operation of the framework for utopia we present here thus realizes the 
advantages of a fi ltering process incorporating mutually improving inter-
action between the fi lter and the surviving products of the generating pro-
cess, so that the quality of generated and nonrejected products improves. 
Furthermore, given people’s historical memories and records, it has the 
feature that an already rejected alternative (or its slight modifi cation) can 
be  retried , perhaps because new or changed conditions make it now seem 
more promising or appropriate. (p. 317) 
 What he fails to explain, however, is what it is that the fi lter device, 
the minimal state, does to enable the ‘nonrejected products’ to 
improve. It also remains quite unclear how it is that the fi lter device 
here uniquely makes it possible for rejected alternatives to be retried. 
Why is it not possible for all of this to happen under  anarchy – in 
a stateless society in which people live in different communities, 
learn from one another, imitate what they like, discard what they 
do not like, and abandon what they cannot improve? There are 
many examples of societies which have done just that. The Gauls in 
the century before Caesar’s invasion, for example, had complex and 
sophisticated systems of trade that sustained a rich material and 
cultural life in a diverse array of communities. They had no state. 
Neither did the cities that made up the Hanseatic League have a 
state, even as they grew rich. 
 On the other hand, it seems quite plausible to think that the 
existence of a framework would prove an obstacle to experimenta-
tion and learning. For one thing, it would be very difficult for soci-
eties which did not produce a signifi cant surplus to survive, even 
if their way of life was extremely congenial to their members, for 
such a surplus would be needed to pay even the minimal taxes any 
state would have to levy. Indeed, historically, the state has been the 
agency that has done signifi cant damage to the diversity of human 
experiments in living because of its need to standardize the commu-
nities under its control in order to calculate the wealth of the people 
and to collect the taxes it sought to raise. If we have any examples 
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of minimal states, perhaps the clearest ones are colonial regimes 
or empires that have tried to interfere only lightly in the societies 
under their control in order to disrupt their productive activities as 
little as possible and maximize the returns from taxation. 4  Yet even 
here, though to varying degrees, the result has not been a fl ourish-
ing of experimentation but a growing conformity since adminis-
tration inevitably requires a common metric by which to regulate 
diversity (see Scott:  1999 ). 
 Nonetheless, perhaps there are some things that a properly con-
stituted minimal state might provide that help bring utopia a lit-
tle nearer, even if it is true that, historically, states have not been 
very good at doing this. (After all, Nozick is, to be fair, offering 
a theory of the kind of state we should aspire to, and not defend-
ing the records of the states of the past.) One possibility is that the 
state brings us closer to utopia by bringing peace and the rule of 
law. The reason this matters from the perspective of the search for 
utopia is that for the process to work it must be possible for individ-
uals to move between communities. If there is no mobility between 
communities, learning will be limited, unsuccessful models can-
not be so readily abandoned, and the pressure on the less attractive 
communities to reform will diminish, to the detriment not only of 
their own members but of people more generally.  A minimal state 
might play a useful role in facilitating or guaranteeing the freedom 
of people to exit the societies they no longer care to live in. 
 The state’s playing such a role might well have some benefi cial 
consequences. Certainly, a measure of mobility is important not 
only for individual wellbeing but also for the purpose of maintain-
ing a sound social order. The obvious question, however, is how 
much mobility is desirable. The propensity to move from one com-
munity is not a natural fact but something conditioned by the com-
plex set of circumstances an individual might face. The likelihood 
of anyone leaving anywhere is going to be profoundly shaped by the 
opportunity cost of exit. But if the state is to determine how easy 
exit is to be, how easy should it make it? Making exit very easy, 
say by subsidizing emigration, would make it easier for people to 
try new communities and ways of life, but may also make many 
people less likely to stick at ways which seems unrewarding at fi rst. 
Many communities simply might not get going, or retain enough 
members to be viable. Some experiments would simply become 
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harder to conduct. Even if the state simply guarantees to protect 
those who wish to leave their communities from being prevented or 
from reprisals from disgruntled community members there will be 
some important consequences for the way the community operates. 
It will increase the bargaining power of dissenters, who would be 
able to use the threat of leaving more effectively. This would not be 
a bad thing in itself, but would nonetheless transform the relations 
among people within the community. For one thing, with the state 
now a player in the game some people will now devote resources to 
cultivating the state. They now have to be in a position not only to 
leave but also to persuade the state that they have a case for protec-
tion. There is no doubt that in some communities the infl uence of 
the state would be a positive one as a consequence of all this, as it 
becomes harder for some societies to repress or restrict their mem-
bers. But in other cases the consequence may be more destructive. 
The question is: what would be the overall impact of the state? It is 
hard to see why it must be a positive one overall. At best, we might 
conclude that the results will vary. That, however, is not enough to 
make the case for the usefulness of the framework as a fi lter device 
for getting us closer to utopia, either severally or collectively. 
 11.5  Can any state bring us to utopia? 
 Robert Nozick has tried to put the case for the value of the min-
imal state. He suggests that it is not only legitimate but also valuable 
because it brings us as close as we can get to achieving the best of all 
possible worlds. It may be that Nozick is right at least to the extent 
that the minimal state is the most likely kind of state to get us to uto-
pia. In the minimal state, the framework is libertarian but the com-
munities within it need not be. Yet even here, the case is not proven. 
If the question of what is the best kind of community is best settled 
by empirical testing, by experiments in living, the same might be 
true for the question of what is the best kind of state. Is there any rea-
son to think, in advance of such experiments, that the minimal state 
is the best candidate compared with other more extensive states? (I 
leave aside the problem of how one would make the judgment when 
comparing states even if experiments could be conducted.) 
 The case for the minimal state looks even weaker, however, when 
we compare it with the alternative of not having a state – at least 
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from the point of view of fi nding utopia. A world without states 
might in fact be one in which the greatest variety of experiments 
might be conducted. If we want people to participate in this pro-
cess we might do better not to create states but to take them down 
(although, in the end, this may simply not be possible). States may 
turn out to be obstacles to the discovery process because states, like 
all institutions, once created, acquire lives and interests of their 
own. The state will never be merely a framework, though some 
states will be more minimal than others. The state will itself offer 
to people a way of life. The difference is that it will have the power 
to defend itself with force – to tax and restructure society in its 
own interests. With the growth of the state, the way of life that will 
become signifi cantly more feasible and attractive will be the life of 
a cosmopolitan. Again, this may not be a bad thing in itself. But it 
is difficult to see the case for encouraging this from the perspective 
of the theory of utopia Nozick has tried to offer. 
 11.6  Where does this leave Nozick? 
 In spite of his best efforts to get us to a utopia that is a society of 
utopias, what Nozick takes us closer toward is the way of life that is 
life in the state. The source of this result, I think, is the initial aspir-
ation of the theory. Nozick asks very explicitly in  ASU whether 
the minimal state could ever be an inspiring ideal. Would people 
man the barricades in its defense? He then sets out to show that the 
minimal state is an ideal that can inspire – one that we might be 
prepared to fi ght for. But what he ends up arguing for, necessarily, 
is the state. He wants to show how the many can live as one. An 
appropriate motto for his state might be something like  E pluribus 
unum . And of course it is hard to imagine any state taking for itself 
a motto like  E pluribus plurum . Out of the many, well,  many . 
 What Nozick has tried to do is show how we can leave  anarchy, 
with its diverse people in different communities, and their diverse 
ways of life, and enter a structure which will not only preserve the 
diversity we fi nd there but also enhance the benefi ts we might gain 
from having a world of diverse people. This, he says, would be uto-
pia. In the end, I think Nozick fails to get us to utopia in spite of 
his best efforts. The problem, however, may lie not in the abilities 
of this most brilliant and imaginative of philosophers but in the 
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aspiration itself. In  Part i of  ASU he tried to show why leaving the 
state of anarchy was morally legitimate; in  Part  iii he tried to show 
why leaving it would be good. In neither enterprise has he been 
convincing. 
 Notes 
  1.  Chambers Combined Dictionary Thesaurus (1997 ). 
  2.  For a libertarian utopia that does, see  Heinlein:  1977 . 
  3.  See, for example,  Van Creveld:  1999 . 
  4.  Nozick’s minimal state does not levy taxes, since most people in its 
territory are clients who  voluntarily pay for its services. The charges 
are not pure market prices, however, since the fees have to be adjusted 
to cover the below-cost or free services provided to those disadvantaged 
by the Dominant Protection Agency through its prohibition of risky 
decision procedures to its clients. (I thank David Gordon for making 
this clear to me.) 
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